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CONFRONTATION IN CHILDREN’S CASES:
THE DIMENSIONS OF LIMITED COVERAGE
Robert P. Mosteller
I. INTRODUCTION
Application of the rules of evidence in cases involving
children is often different than in those involving adults. The
central reason for the variation is not difficult to understand.
Children have limited capacities, and in providing evidence
generally and presenting evidence in the courtroom, they face
special challenges. In multiple minor ways, courts simply have
no alternative other than making some adjustments. Frequently,
judges will entertain more significant accommodations, as well,
to avoid the loss of valuable evidence or minimize the trauma of
testimony. In child sexual abuse cases, the revolting nature of
the crimes puts its own emotional pressure on courts to admit
the child’s evidence.
Hearsay is particularly important in many cases in which
children are victims because of the need to supplement the
incomplete versions of events provided by children as witnesses
in the stressful environment of trials. Initial statements regarding
the events are often needed to convict because the crimes are
committed in private with no outside witnesses and frequently no
definitive physical or scientific evidence of either the crime or
the identity of the perpetrator.
Given these background facts, it would hardly be surprising
if application of Crawford v. Washington and its new testimonial
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statement approach to confrontation doctrine1 was more nuanced,
complicated, and uncertain in cases involving children. Although
the doctrine’s application is undeniably different, it is generally
not less certain. The lines in most cases involving children are
just as clear as in adult cases—perhaps even clearer for some
commonly encountered situations.
However, the general uncertainty and flexibility brought into
the confrontation analysis by the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Michigan v. Bryant,2 with its elaborate multifactor
test to determine whether the questioning relates to an ongoing
emergency, will likely have a significant effect in children’s
cases. The complicated Bryant test effectively gives lower courts
a large measure of discretion in resolving the testimonial
concept’s application by making the determination dependent
upon numerous elements of the case, potentially going beyond
the emergency issue that was the immediate focus of Bryant.3
Where the law of confrontation goes from here, in general
and in children’s cases, is hardly settled. As it now stands, the
doctrine applies clearly only to a limited number of situations,
regardless of whether the declarant is a child or an adult. In the
large remainder of cases, lower courts make decisions regarding
a potentially testimonial statement using a heavily fact-dependent
and largely discretionary form of analysis that is likely to result
in admission of apparently important and reliable, but unconfronted, hearsay. We are moving toward a Confrontation
Clause where Crawford is uniformly applied to a very modest
number of cases and where, for a sizeable group of other cases,
its application is unpredictable. This same pattern is found in

1

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), refocused the
Confrontation Clause on testimonial statements in sharp contrast to the
trustworthiness or reliability basis of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
2
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
3
In Bryant, statements of a seriously injured man to police officers about
the identity of the person who shot him and the circumstances of the
shooting, although removed in time and space from the offense, were ruled
nontestimonial because the police inquiry related to resolving the existence of
an ongoing emergency. Id. at 1150.
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cases involving children.4 As the dimensions of the Crawford
system were initially being defined, courts and commentators
complained primarily of the unpredictability of Confrontation
Clause law. Another two major questions should be added now:
whether the lines drawn by the testimonial doctrine make sense,
and, more significantly, whether the resulting system has been
worth the effort.
In Part II, I describe the somewhat uncertain future of the
Crawford doctrine. As the doctrine is applied to hearsay of
different types and in varying situations, its support among
members of the Supreme Court has declined. In Part III, I
demonstrate the clarity of application of the testimonial
statement doctrine to most types of statements made by children.
By bringing trial court discretion into play, Bryant has the
potential to limit the application of the doctrine in the one area
where protection has been clear. Part IV highlights the difficulty
of reaching clear results for statements produced for multiple
purposes. Part V examines a number of discrete issues involving
principally the elicitation of testimony from children who testify,
bemoaning the limited efforts to help facilitate and expand
confrontation as an alternative to exclusion of the testimony or
broadly denying defendants the right to confront child witnesses.
II. THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF CRAWFORD AS CONSENSUS
ERODES IN THE SUPREME COURT
As the Crawford approach loses commitment within the
Court, it is possible, although unlikely, that the testimonial
statement doctrine could be greatly limited or wiped off the
books. While the present Court is unlikely to do an about-face
and reverse Crawford, the voting pattern shows declining
support. The near consensus that existed in the Crawford

4

Although a few features of the analysis might resemble the old Roberts
system, the new multi-factored analysis is directed to the definitional question
of whether the statement is testimonial, whereas the old system focused upon
the substantive issue of trustworthiness. See id. at 1162 (“In determining
whether a declarant’s statements are testimonial, courts should look to all of
the relevant circumstances.”).
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decision—which commanded a 7-2 majority5—and Davis v.
Washington—which was virtually unanimous6—is a relic of the
past.
On the one hand, Justice Scalia remains enthusiastically on
board as architect and author of Crawford,7 Davis, California v.
Giles,8 and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.9 Among the justices
on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has been his most consistent
supporter, apparently driven by her liberal views rather than
Justice Scalia’s originalism. The remaining seven justices,
however, are not consistent supporters of Crawford.
Changes in the Court’s membership played a minor role in
reducing support for the Crawford approach. When the more
liberal Justices Stevens and Souter were replaced by the more
moderate Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, whatever impact the right
to confrontation might have had on criminal procedure was
reduced.10 Justice Breyer’s conversion from a contributing member
of the group of Justices and scholars who created the new
Confrontation Clause doctrine that became Crawford,11 to a fullfledged opponent, played a more major role. During oral argument
in Giles, Breyer and Scalia had a telling exchange in which Breyer
announced his impending exit from the Crawford enterprise:
5

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor agreed with the result,
but they would have retained Roberts. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75–76
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring).
6
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Davis was unanimous but
for Justice Thomas’ concurrence, which related to the lack of formality of the
statement, which was not at issue in the case.
7
Scalia has described Crawford as his favorite opinion. See JEFFREY
TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 317
(2007).
8
California v. Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
9
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
10
On the other hand, Justice Stevens’ sensitivity to domestic abuse may
have also have produced his dissenting vote in Giles. See Giles, 554 U.S. at
404 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s requiring subjective
intent to silence the witness as a predicate for forfeiture by wrongdoing
would disproportionately impact domestic violence prosecutions).
11
Justice Breyer proposed examining an alternative to the Roberts system
in his concurring opinion in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140–43 (1999)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
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Justice Breyer: I joined Crawford, and Justice Scalia
would like to kick me off the boat, which I’m rapidly
leaving in any event, but the . . . .
Justice Scalia: You jumped off in Crawford, I thought.12
Justice Breyer’s vigorous dissent in Giles confirmed his
departure.13 Concerns about the impact of Crawford on domestic
violence prosecutions are likely at the heart of his shift in
position.14 Justice Breyer is now a solid vote for a much
different approach than the current Crawford-based doctrine
offers, and potentially even for starting over.15
Chief Justice Roberts supported the Crawford enterprise
initially, joining the Davis and Giles opinions, but he turned
away in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, joining
the dissent in both opinions,16 and he joined Justice Sotomayor’s
limiting opinion in Bryant. Justice Alito has had a similar voting
pattern to Chief Justice Roberts, although his earlier support was
even more limited.17 Three Justices, Roberts, Alito, and Breyer,
constitute a solid group in opposition to Crawford’s approach,
and Justice Kennedy, who authored a spirited dissent in
Bullcoming18 appears to be part of that oppositional group.19
12

Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (No. 076053) [hereinafter Giles Transcript]. In the Bryant argument, Justice Breyer
stated: “I joined Crawford, but I have to admit to you I have had many
second thoughts when I’ve seen how far it has extended . . . .” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 35, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09150) [hereinafter Bryant Transcript].
13
See Giles, 554 U.S. at 381–404 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14
See id. at 404 (noting the particular impact on domestic violence cases
of the Court’s rule requiring intent to silence the witness for a forfeiture by
wrongdoing).
15
In the Giles argument, Justice Breyer expressed a strong opposition to
Crawford’s approach: “[m]aybe we have to assume an intent to allow the
contours of the Confrontation Clause to evolve as the law of evidence itself
evolves.” Giles Transcript, supra note 12, at 34–35.
16
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 U.S. 2705, 2723 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527,
2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17
See infra notes 23–24 (describing Justice Alito’s strict view of the
formality requirement for testimonial statements).
18
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer joined Kennedy’s
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Justice Thomas shares Justice Scalia’s commitment to the
originalist jurisprudence on which the testimonial concept and
the Crawford opinion are based, but he supports a much
narrower definition of “testimonial” that requires strict formality
of the statement.20 In Justice Thomas’s view, the statement must
be memorialized in written or recorded form to be testimonial, a
requirement that would significantly limit the application of the
testimonial concept.21 Indeed, Justice Thomas takes the position
that, except where statements are informally taken to evade
confrontation, if the statement is not in written form or its
modern equivalent (such as recorded interrogation in Crawford),
it is not testimonial.22 Justice Alito has joined Justice Thomas’s
apparent repudiation of the Crawford doctrine in his dissent in Bullcoming.
19
Although questioning in an oral argument is often poor evidence for a
justice’s position, Kennedy’s questioning in the most recent confrontation
case, Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011), suggests a more supportive
position regarding the Crawford approach to expert evidence than his recent
dissents in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz would suggest. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 22, Williams, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (No. 10-8505) (apparently
supporting the defendant’s position in noting that if the expert’s statement
was not used for its truth it would be irrelevant). The other Justices—
Roberts, Alito, and Breyer—showed no signs of uncertainty in their
opposition during that oral argument. See generally id.
20
See Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the
“Testimonial” Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 429, 433–38
(2007) (discussing the majority’s softening of formality in the definition of
“testimonial” as compared to the approach taken by Justice Thomas).
21
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Confrontation
Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions.”).
22
In Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), Justice Thomas concurred
in the judgment because the parties had not contested the testimonial quality
of the statement. Nevertheless, he expressed his commitment to the
fundamental requirement of formality of the statement, expressing his
position as follows:
I write separately to note that I adhere to my view that statements
like those made by the victim in this case do not implicate the
Confrontation Clause. The contested evidence is indistinguishable
from the statements made during police questioning in response to
the report of domestic violence in Hammon v. Indiana, decided with
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strict formality position.23 Thus, despite their approval of the
holding in Crawford, Justices Thomas and Alito have expressed
opposition to treating oral statements to the police as testimonial.
Their position is contrary to the outcomes in Hammon v.
Indiana24 and Giles,25 which both involved such oral statements.
As a result, a majority of the Court now opposes finding
ordinary witness statements to the police testimonial, eliminating
the right of confrontation for a substantial category of the
statements that lower courts routinely find within Crawford’s
testimonial definition.26
Davis v. Washington. There, as here, the police questioning was not
“a formalized dialogue”; it was not “sufficiently formal to resemble
the Marian examinations” because “the statements were neither
Mirandized nor custodial, nor accompanied by any similar indicia of
formality”; and “there is no suggestion that the prosecution
attempted to offer [Ms. Avie’s] hearsay evidence at trial in order to
evade confrontation.”
Id. at 377–78 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part)).
23
In his Giles concurrence, Justice Alito wrote “separately to make clear
that, like Justice Thomas, [he was] not convinced that the out-of-court
statement at issue [t]here fell within the Confrontation Clause in the first
place.” Id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring).
24
In addition to a written statement by the victim, Hammon involved the
police officer’s testimony regarding what she orally told him. See Davis, 547
U.S. at 820. Given the position Justice Alito took in Giles to associate
himself with Justice Thomas’ view, it is somewhat inexplicable that he joined
the Davis opinion rather than joining Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion. See
id. at 840 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting the oral statement given to the
police in Hammon lacked sufficient formality to be considered testimonial).
25
In Giles, Justices Thomas and Alito joined the opinion because the
state had not contested the testimonial character of the statement to police.
Giles, 554 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 377 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
26
These two justices diverge, however, in their view of the propriety of
treating forensic certificates as testimonial, Justice Thomas supporting that
treatment and Justice Alito opposing it. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
129 S. Ct. 2527, 2530, 2543 (2009) (Justice Thomas joining Justice Scalia’s
opinion and Justice Alito joining Justice Kennedy’s dissent); see also
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709, 2723 (2011) (Justice
Thomas joining Justice Ginsburg’s majority except as to two parts and Justice
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Let’s imagine that the Court considers in its next term an
oral statement to a police officer by a victim, and the
prosecution challenges the testimonial quality of the oral
statement on grounds that included its lack of formality. Were it
not for stare decisis, the Court would presumably find the
statement not testimonial by a vote of 5 to 4. Justice Thomas
would join the four who dissented in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming—Roberts, Breyer, Kennedy, and Alito—to form a
five-justice majority that would find the statement outside the
testimonial definition. The newly reshaped doctrine would bar
only the formally testimonial statements endorsed by Justice
Thomas in his White concurrence, which include formal written
statements, forensic certificates, and other formal testimonial
documents of the type covered by Melendez-Diaz, as well as
recorded interrogations at the stationhouse of the type involved
in the Crawford case.27 However, assuming a commitment to
stare decisis is sufficient to preserve the Hammon and Giles
results, there appears to be a sustainable majority for Crawford’s
basic testimonial statement approach, albeit with a limited reach.
Justice Sotomayor provides the swing vote to shape the
testimonial doctrine. Her opinion in Bryant effectively narrowed
the scope of testimonial statements by expanding the meaning of
ongoing emergency and enlarging the factors, including hearsay
exceptions, relevant to a testimonial determination. She
supported the Melendez-Diaz concept, but she suggested
limitations on that aspect of the doctrine through her concurring
opinion in Bullcoming.28

Alito joining Justice Kennedy’s dissent).
27
It is a substantial question whether that retrenchment would cause the
Court to overrule the Crawford doctrine and start over, or maintain the
dramatically restricted doctrine going forward.
28
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720–23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Certiorari was granted a few days later to resolve the issue identified in her
concurring opinion of whether testimonial documents are covered by the
Confrontation Clause when used for the traditional non-hearsay purpose of
supporting the opinion of a testifying expert. See People v. Williams, 939
N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (June 28, 2011) (No.
10-8505).
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III. RESULTS IN CHILDREN’S CASES
I will not restate here why I find analysis that focuses on the
compromised intent or expectation of the child because of
developmental limitations to be practically unhelpful,29 or why I
conclude there is no reason to create a general exception for
treating children as witnesses covered by the Confrontation
Clause.30 Where the declarant is a child, Davis effectively shifts
29

See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and
Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J.
917, 975–84 (2007).
30
At this symposium, Professor Richard Friedman continued to argue for
developing a general exception to treating young children as witness even
when they make clearly accusatory statements to law enforcement officials
because he contends their statements are qualitatively different from those
made by adults and outside the definition of testimonial utterances. His
proposal would eliminate all protections against these accusatory statements
under the Confrontation Clause. He develops his generalized argument from
the aberrational case of State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989). See
Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Child Quasi-Witness (Nov. 11,
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy);
see also Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,”
71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005). Webb involved virtually
incomprehensible words uttered by an eighteen-month child, 779 P.2d at
1108–09, which the state court ultimately held were insufficient as a matter
of state law to support a guilty verdict. Id. at 1115.
As I have set out in an earlier article, when one reads the vast range of
cases, particularly criminal cases, that involve the words of children
presented through their hearsay statement, one finds these statements to be
comprehensible assertions of functioning human beings with purposeful
communicative abilities. They are not, I contend, mere pieces of evidence
that are distinct in kind from the statements of adults. See Mosteller, supra
note 29, at 975–76. Professor Friedman’s proposal, which unfortunately is
not carefully cabined to the aberrational case, is ill-conceived and destructive
of the limited confrontation rights defendants enjoy under the testimonial
approach. His contention that the destruction of Confrontation Clause
protections in this area would be offset by the creation of a right of
examination of the child by a defendant-selected expert under the Due
Process Clause is unfortunately highly unlikely under existing doctrine or as a
matter of legislative grace in a world of constrained resources. Moreover, he
provides no theory for a necessary link between his proposed destruction of
Confrontation Clause coverage for children’s statements and creation of this
new right. If there is a right of expert examination of children, it should
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the court’s analysis of whether a statement is testimonial from
the declarant’s purpose in giving a statement to the purpose of
the questioner. Although Justice Scalia, citing Professor Richard
Friedman’s work, contends that “[t]he declarant’s intent is what
counts,”31 the Supreme Court in Bryant stated that “Davis
requires a combined inquiry that accounts for both the declarant
and the interrogator.”32 In my view, courts analyze the intent of
the questioner in children’s cases because that perspective has
some potential to give the inquiry an objective base and avoid
easy manipulation of outcomes.33
A. Statements to Police
In cases involving child declarants, statements to police are
generally treated as testimonial because children are typically not
already have been recognized, particularly in the myriad of situations where
the right of confrontation is not presently protected. Finally, courts can
embrace his destruction of the Confrontation Clause right under his argument
that such children’s statements are not testimonial even for accusatory
statements made by children to government investigators without providing
any compensating protection, and I fear that if they do anything with his
proposal, this one-way denial of confrontation protection will be the result.
31
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,”
71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2005)).
32
Id. at 1160 (majority opinion).
33
In an earlier article, I elaborated on my analysis as follows:
In situations where the statement would be clearly testimonial if
judged from the questioner’s perspective, courts generally reject
limiting the testimonial concept based on either the subjective and
limited child’s perspective or the similar result achieved by an
objective approach considering the age and circumstances of the
child. I suggest that [they] do so because they find outcomes based
on those perspectives so unpalatable. The statement may be highly
accusatorial and would have been clearly testimonial if it had been
made by an adult, and the adult who is receiving the statement may
fully appreciate its use. The courts seem most troubled that this
analysis would permit the statement to be used despite extraordinary
clear purpose by the government questioner, given the Supreme
Court’s focus on the dangers of governmental manipulation.
Mosteller, supra note 29, at 980 (citations omitted).
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accessible to the police until after an ongoing emergency has
concluded. However, Bryant may alter that result at the margins
and potentially work more substantial changes in outcomes
through its invitation to lower courts to apply an open-textured,
multifactored analysis.
In an earlier article, I wrote:
Unlike in domestic violence cases, the police do not
generally encounter a child still in an emergency
situation, nor does the child call an agent of the police,
such as a 911 operator. Rather, in cases involving
children, the police are summoned by parents or other
adults after these private parties have secured the child’s
immediate safety and often after they have determined
that a crime has occurred. Perhaps also the uniformity of
the response has resulted because Justice Scalia indicated
that a mistake had likely been made in White regarding
the statement of the child to the police.34
The cases treat statements to the police as nontestimonial in
the unusual situation where the police encounter the child in an
undefined situation or a clear emergency.35 The Bryant decision
34

See id. at 949–50. In Wright v. State, 673 S.E.2d 249, 253 (Ga.
2009), the Georgia Supreme Court found that statements made by a child,
who was three or four at the time of the statement, were testimonial when
made in response to an officer’s question regarding “what happened.”
Wright, 673 S.E.2d at 253. The child’s mother had a bruise on her face. This
conclusion was reached without extended analysis apparently because it was
straightforward in the absence of evidence presented regarding an ongoing
emergency. Id.
35
In Commonwealth v. Patterson, 946 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Mass. App. Ct.
2011), the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled nontestimonial the statements
of a five-year-old child as the officers walked into what the court described
as a “volatile and unstable scene of domestic disturbance.” The child stated:
“He pushed Mommy into the wall. He had a gun.” Id. at 132. The statement
was made spontaneously, without police questioning. The court concluded
that there was nothing to indicate that it was made for any purpose other than
securing aid.
Lagunas v. State, 187 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005), which was
decided before the Davis decision, presents a fact pattern resembling an
ordinary criminal case more than the typical child sexual abuse case. The
child’s mother had been kidnapped from her home where a four-year-old
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is unlikely to change the outcome in the typical situation, since
no ongoing emergency will exist at the time the police have their
first conversation with the child. However, Bryant will certainly
add some flexibility for courts to find initial statements by a
child to law enforcement officers to be nontestimonial by
expanding the definition of an ongoing emergency to include
those where the potential dangers to the child or the child’s
condition, for example, have not been fully clarified.
Questioning by law enforcement may serve many
nontestimonial purposes. Bryant recognized that the existence or
nature of the declarant’s injuries might be relevant to the
primary purpose inquiry enunciated in Davis.36 The police may
also want to learn the identity of the perpetrator to determine
whether he remains a threat to other children or to the victim
herself. If they are uncertain of the accuracy of information
provided by adults caring for or having access to the child, the
police may also want to confirm with the child the identity of
the perpetrator.
In most situations, those issues will be clearly resolved
before the officers gain their first access to the child. In other
cases, where a known perpetrator “flee[s] with little prospect of
posing a threat to the public,” as occurred in both Illinois v.
White37 and Davis, there is a diminished likelihood that an
emergency continues. Nevertheless, after Bryant, arguments that
a declaration by a child is nontestimonial will be quite plausible
in a number of standard situations, such as where the perpetrator
child remained. A police officer returned to the home after the mother
escaped, where he found the child. The officer asked the child “what
happened to her mommy. And she stated that ‘A bad man had killed her and
took her away.’” Id. at 508. The court concluded that the initial question was
not testimonial because the officer’s questions were motivated by concerns
for the safety and welfare of the child. The child’s response “amounted to a
small child’s expressions of fear.” Id. at 519. The officer also asked followup questions, which might be treated as testimonial, as the Supreme Court in
Davis treated the victim’s statements after the defendant had left the
premises. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
36
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159.
37
Illinois v. White, 502 U.S. 346, 349 (1992) (describing the babysitter
being awakened by the child’s screams and seeing the defendant first leave
the child’s room and then the house).
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remains unidentified, may be a member of the household, or
may potentially have continuing access to the child or other
children. Indeed, before Bryant, in response to arguments of this
type, courts found these statements to be nontestimonial because
the period of the emergency was extended, and social workers
were seen as questioning the child to meet their responsibility
for her safety and welfare.38 After Bryant’s general expansion of
the scope of emergencies and the types of concerns viewed as
included in police questioning directed to resolving those
emergencies, arguments of this sort will likely have more
persuasive power if made regarding police inquiries of the child.
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Bryant may have overstated the
impact of the case on the Crawford testimonial doctrine.
However, the opinion’s one clear impact is the signal it sends to
lower courts, particularly trial courts, that the line between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements is not clear. This is the
case even when the statement was made to law enforcement
officers regarding past criminal events, and the testimonial
quality of the statement is subject to a fact-dependent and
uncertain analysis. My sense is that in the wake of the Davis
opinion, courts have consistently ruled that statements by
38

In Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 857–58 (Pa. 2009),
cert. granted, vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1597 (2011), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruled that questioning by a county caseworker a week after an assault
was nontestimonial because it was for the purpose of ensuring children’s
safety given unresolved issues about who was the person responsible for the
assault. On remand from the United States Supreme Court after Bryant, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the result on largely the same grounds,
albeit slightly broader grounds invited by Bryant. See Allshouse, 36 A.3d at
176–82 (Pa. 2012). Similarly, in State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 778–80 (N.J.
2008), the New Jersey Supreme Court found that questioning by a member of
a special response team from the Division of Youth and Family Services was
not testimonial because it was for the purpose of determining how to protect
a injured child from the source of his injuries, which appeared to be the
adults charged with his care. See generally Christopher C. Kendall, Note &
Comment, Ongoing Emergency in Incest Cases: Forensic Interviewing Post
Davis, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 157, 170–80 (2010) (arguing
that in cases of incest the gathering of data to determine the identity of the
perpetrator and to protect the child from continued victimization should be
treated as nontestimonial because its purpose is to meet an ongoing
emergency).
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children to law enforcement officers are testimonial, despite
disliking the outcome, because they conclude that there are no
credible alternative interpretations. This consistency in treating
such statements as testimonial is in contrast to the early
decisions after Crawford when a number of courts latched onto
widely varying arguments in an apparent attempt to avoid
finding the statements excluded under the Confrontation
Clause.39 Whatever else results from Bryant, it provides judges
with multiple additional grounds40 on which to justify admission
when they are concerned about the consequences of excluding
hearsay statements to the police, even those previously clearly
testimonial statements made by children in relatively settled
situations. Consistency will predictably diminish with regard to
the admissibility of children’s statements to the police.41
B. Statements to Family Members and Friends
Statements to parents, family members, and friends are
uniformly considered not testimonial. This result was solidified
after Davis established that the primary purpose of the
questioner was relevant. Courts freely assume that private
individuals generally, and family members in particular, ask
questions of the child for the primary purpose of ensuring the
health and welfare of the child rather than prosecuting the
39

See, e.g., State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27–29 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004), aff’d, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005) (ruling statement by victim to
police officer not testimonial because not sufficiently formal in that it was
spontaneous and made in the field), cert. granted, vacated, 548 U.S. 923
(2006) (remanding “for further consideration in light of Davis”).
40
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing the
many types of factors to be considered by the trial court under the Court’s
newly established open-ended and amorphous definition of an ongoing
emergency).
41
The implications of Bryant are likely to be felt in other areas as well.
Statements to multidisciplinary teams, discussed later, see infra Part IV,
which are frequently videotaped and introduced at trial, are not testimonial if
made primarily for a medical purpose and if made during an ongoing
emergency, both of which may be broadly construed after Bryant. They are
testimonial if made for a clearly forensic purpose, and clarity may be difficult
to find in Bryant’s wake.
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perpetrator, even though both purposes are logically of
concern.42
Some lower courts have identified a more fundamental
dichotomy, which the Supreme Court has certainly not rejected:
statements to private individuals are categorically not
testimonial,43 except in the rare situation where they were made
purposefully to avoid the making of what would be considered a
testimonial statement.44 In Michigan v. Bryant,45 Justice
42

In State v. Ahmed, 782 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), the
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that a statement made to the child’s
grandmother outside an interview room was not testimonial. Its result was
justified under both a far-reaching approach that the statement was
nontestimonial because not made to a government official and a traditional
approach regarding the purpose of the questioning. Id. Utilizing the
traditional interpretation, it recognized that the child was expressing pain to a
close relative from whom he expected help and comfort, albeit a statement
made just outside the room where a formal interview by governmental
officials was to occur. Id. Similarly, in State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250, 256
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007), the Washington Court of Appeals ruled that a child’s
statement made to her family members was not testimonial because the
questioners were not contemplating prosecution of a criminal case but rather
were concerned about her physical well-being and future safety.
43
In Ahmed, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that “[s]tatements
made to nongovernmental questioners, who are ‘not acting in concert with or
as an agent of the government’ are considered nontestimonial.” Ahmed, 782
N.W.2d at 259 (quoting State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 514–15 (Minn.
2006)). Similarly, in State v. Coder, 968 A.2d 1175 (N.J. 2009), the New
Jersey Supreme Court stated the inference negatively: “neither mother acted
‘predominantly as an agent/proxy or an operative for law enforcement in the
collection of evidence of past crimes for use in a later criminal prosecution,
circumstances that may well render the hearsay statements thereby procured
testimonial under Crawford.’” Id. at 1186 (quoting Buda, 949 A.2d at 779–
80).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799,
816 (Tenn. 2010), entertained making a ruling that statements made to private
parties are per se not testimonial. However, following the lead of the
Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Brown, 173 P.3d 612, 633 (Kan. 2007),
it chose to avoid resting its result exclusively on that ground and instead
applied a multi-factored analysis. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 818.
44
In Davis, Justice Thomas acknowledged that statements to private
individuals, which he believed were generally excluded from the class of
testimonial statements, had to be considered testimonial if made to avoid the
protections of the Confrontation Clause. He stated his position as follows:

408

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Sotomayor noted that the Court in Davis had “explicitly reserved
the question of ‘whether and when statements made to someone
other than law enforcement personnel are “testimonial.”’”46 She
remarked that Justice Scalia in his dissent had supported one of
his arguments with King v. Brasier,47 a Framing-era English case
involving a statement made by a child to her mother, a private
citizen, just after the child had been sexually assaulted.
However, Justice Scalia responded that he “remain[ed] agnostic
about whether and when statements to nonstate actors are
testimonial.”48
The citation of Brasier has implications for several major
issues of confrontation interpretation. As I have noted earlier,
Brasier is a difficult case to analyze from an originalist point of
view because at the time the Sixth Amendment was framed, the
published version of the opinion discussed the competency of a
young child to testify, without addressing hearsay and
confrontation.49 However, Scalia quotes from a version of the
case published some decades later. In this later version, the facts
had been revised to indicate that the case involved a hearsay
accusation by the child presented in court by her mother and
another witness, which the English court ruled could not be
received.50 If accepted as part of the originalist foundational
understanding of excluded hearsay at the time of the
Constitution’s framing, Brasier would alter current confrontation
outcomes substantially. The statement of the child to her mother
“Because the Confrontation Clause sought to regulate prosecutorial abuse
occurring through use of ex parte statements as evidence against the accused,
it also reaches the use of technically informal statements when used to evade
the formalized process.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838 (2006)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
45
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143.
46
See id. at 1155 n.3.
47
King v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.) 202–03; 1 Leach
199. She also commented that Chief Justice Rehnquist had cited it in
Crawford. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69–70 (2004)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Scalia had previously cited Brasier in
Davis. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
48
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49
See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 927–29.
50
Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203; 1 Leach at 200.
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and another private individual in Brasier are similar to those
generally ruled nontestimonial by modern courts, but in Brasier,
the statements were seen as equivalent to testimony. Brasier’s
existence and citation are unlikely to have such a profound effect
as to alter all these outcomes. I suspect that the broader
interpretation will be ignored.51
Indeed, the Court may well treat as nontestimonial all
statements to private parties. Shortly after Crawford was
decided, a few courts took that position. In State v. Geno,52 for
example, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that a statement
made by a child to the executive director of the local Children’s
Assessment Center was nontestimonial, relying heavily on the
fact that the person receiving the information was a private
individual.53 This change or clarification of confrontation law
would have a substantial effect. Many, likely most, individuals
who receive accusatory statements from children are private
individuals, and many organizations that conduct interviews of
children are private nonprofit agencies and private organizations,
such as hospitals.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Buda54
goes a bit further and considers statements nontestimonial if
made even to government investigators when they are not
enforcing the criminal law. This more subtle distinction was
made in a case involving questioning by an employee of the
Office of Child Abuse Control at the Division of Youth and
Family Services (“DYFS”): the court ruled that the statements
were not testimonial because the questions were asked for a
protective purpose. In the discussion of the work done by the
interviewer, the court stated that the investigative role of the
interviewer was civil in nature—as opposed to the criminal
purpose of law enforcement—despite the fact that these civil and
criminal systems were both operating against a defendant. The
court concluded that “our inquiry is informed by the explicit
recognition that a DYFS worker acting in a proper civil role
51
52
53
54

See Mosteller, supra note 29, at 931–32.
State v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 692.
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).
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does not trigger considerations that are unique to criminal trials,
including the Confrontation Clause.”55 Conceivably, the Supreme
Court could rule that only criminal investigations conducted by
law enforcement agents and those working in explicit
cooperation with them are even potentially testimonial. While
this would have little impact in most traditional criminal
prosecutions, it would potentially change many of the current
standard responses in children’s cases and sexual assault cases
where governmental employees at social service agencies are
frequently involved in interviews.
C. Statements to Doctors
In Bryant, the Court stated:
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an
interrogation is to respond to an “ongoing emergency,”
its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is
not within the scope of the Clause. But there may be
other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies,
when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose
of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.
In making the primary purpose determination, standard
rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as
reliable, will be relevant. Where no such primary
purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the
concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the
Confrontation Clause.56
More specifically, the Court stated in Giles that “statements
to physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be
57
excluded, if at all, only by hearsay rules.” Thus, when doctors
receive statements in the course of treatment, those statements
are nontestimonial. In People v. Duhs,58 a doctor treated a threeyear-old child in the emergency room for second- and thirddegree burns to his feet. During the course of the examination,
55
56
57
58

Id. at 779.
See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008).
People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011).

Confrontation in Children’s Cases

411

the doctor asked the child how he had been injured to properly
administer treatment. The New York Court of Appeals stated that
it is of no moment that the pediatrician may have had a
secondary motive for her inquiry, namely, to fulfill her
ethical and legal duty, as a mandatory reporter of child
abuse, to investigate whether the child was potentially a
victim of abuse. Her first and paramount duty was to
render medical assistance to an injured child.59
In an earlier article, I suggested that a broad reading should be
given to medical purpose, which would usually include the identity
of the perpetrator when statements are elicited during the initial
medical exam or exams.60 This appears to be the pattern in the
lower courts, and with the liberalizing impact of Bryant, one would
assume at least such a broad interpretation would continue.
However, simply citing the term “medical purpose” should not be
a talisman. For example, an examination by a psychologist rather
than a medical doctor secured weeks after an injury at the behest of
law enforcement or a social service agency should have no
presumption of nontestimonial status.61 Similarly, after the
treatment inquiry has been completed, later interviews by medical
personnel gathering evidence for prosecutions should be considered
testimonial even though it is secured by medical personnel.62
59

Id. at 620; see also, e.g., People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218–22 (Cal.
2007) (ruling that response to question “what happened” from emergency
room physician treating the victim for a laceration to his face and neck was
nontestimonial and finding that reporting requirement for abuse does not
transform doctors into investigative agents); State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d
287 (Tenn. 2008) (making a similar nontestimonial ruling for statements
made by a rape victim to a nurse in the emergency room).
60
Mosteller, supra note 29, at 950–57. But see David J. Carey,
Reliability Discarded: The Irrelevance of the Medical Exception to Hearsay in
Post-Crawford Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 653 (2009) (protesting the effective expansion of medical hearsay
exception and its use as a basis for exclusion of statements from testimonial
concept).
61
See Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 858–59 (Pa. 2009),
cert. granted, vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1597 (2011) (not reaching the issue with
regard to a psychologist interview two weeks after injury because it would
have been harmless in any case).
62
See Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 305 (ruling that statements to sexual

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

412

D. Statements to Social Workers
Social workers for departments of social services generally
have responsibilities that overlap with law enforcement duties,
and statutes frequently require coordination between the two
groups.63 Whether statements secured by social workers
investigating potential abuse are testimonial depends on whether
the statements are secured for the purpose of ensuring the
child’s safety and well-being, or collecting information about
past events for prosecutorial purposes.64 The degree of
coordination with, and involvement by, the police can be
critical.65 However, because it demonstrates the existence of an
ongoing emergency, the most important factor, where it exists,
is a genuine and immediate need to assess the circumstances for
the purpose of protecting the child, which renders the statement
nontestimonial under the rationale of Davis.
In Bobadilla v. Carlson,66 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found an interview testimonial despite arguments
by the government that the purpose was the welfare of the child,
relying heavily on the lack of an ongoing emergency and the
absence of an immediate need for protective action. The
interview took place five days after the abuse, which was seen
by the court as strong evidence that the purpose was to confirm
past allegations of abuse rather than to assess immediate threats
to the child’s health and welfare.67 A similar result was reached
assault nurse examiner subsequent to treatment in the emergency room were
testimonial).
63
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 626.556(3)(f) (2011); see also Bobadilla v.
Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2009).
64
See State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 780 (N.J. 2008).
65
See Bobadilla, 575 F.3d at 791–92; see also Styron v. State, 34 So.
3d 724, 732 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
66
Bobadilla, 575 F.3d at 791.
67
See id. at 791; see also Styron, 34 So. 3d at 732 (noting that the
interview did not occur until four days after the report of molestation). Time
must be evaluated relative to the information about the nature of the threat to
the child’s safety. In Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa.
2009), although a week had passed from the time of the abuse, the statement
was ruled nontestimonial because the interview occurred only a day after the
social worker received information that the threat to the child was from a
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in State v. Hopkins, involving statements made by a child when
a social worker visited the child for a second time after the child
had made new disclosures regarding abuse.68 There, the court
found that, although the second interview could be construed as
protecting the child, it was far removed from the initial
emergency and produced incriminating statements, and therefore
was testimonial.69 By contrast, in State v. Buda,70 concern for the
child’s safety was ongoing at the time of the interview since the
social worker had reason to conclude the battered child needed
protection from the adults charged with her basic care.71
IV. MULTIPURPOSE STATEMENTS
As the Court’s opinion in Davis concluded, a single
statement—there, a call to a 911 operator—can have multiple
purposes.72 In child sexual abuse cases, many statements can
have multiple purposes, including statements made to sexual
assault nurses. I will concentrate on a specialized form of the
multipurpose statement. In child abuse cases, many jurisdictions
have developed procedures for videotaped interviews that serve
the purposes of multiple organizations. The recorded statement
produced for these multiple parties is designed to reduce the
number of times a child must be interviewed. Determining how
to treat these interviews, and specifically the issue of their
primary purpose, presents a challenge. The interview procedures
create a record that serves very effectively as evidence at trial. It
also has the potential nontestimonial purposes of protecting the
child from future harm and facilitating treatment.
Although the treatment of such an interview depends on the
specific facts of the particular case, a large number of courts
person with immediate access to the child.
68
State v. Hopkins, 154 P.3d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
69
Id. at 256–58.
70
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).
71
Id. at 778–80.
72
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006) (stating that a
conversation that begins as an interrogation to determine the need for
emergency assistance can evolve into testimonial statements once the initial
purpose has been achieved).
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have found these statements to be testimonial, determining that
there was no ongoing emergency and the primary purpose was
to prove past facts for prosecution.73 However, the decisions of
two state supreme courts that use differing modes of assessment
for the primary purpose analysis illustrate the uncertainty of
outcomes that is likely only to be exacerbated by the Bryant
decision.
In In re S.P.,74 the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that
an interview conducted by CARES Northwest, a child abuse
assessment center, was testimonial. It recognized the evaluation
served a dual purpose for the child, referred to as N.
N’s statements were necessary to provide an accurate
diagnosis of whether N had been abused, but they were
also necessary to develop and preserve evidence of the
alleged abuse for later presentation in juvenile court. The
two purposes “are concurrent and coequal; both are
‘primary’ in the sense that neither takes precedence over
the other.”75
The S.P. court resolved the dual purpose by concluding that
this agency, which acts as a proxy for the police, conducts the
type of ex parte examinations that trigger Confrontation Clause
protection. The court, therefore, concluded that statements by
the child describing the abuse and identifying the perpetrator
were testimonial.76
73

See, e.g., State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 905 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he
primary, if not the sole, purpose of the [Child Protection Team] interview
was to investigate whether the crime of child sexual abuse had occurred, and
to establish facts potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”); In re
Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 613 (Ill. 2008) (“Furthermore, since there is
no indication that the primary purpose of the interview was for treatment and
because [the child] was no longer in any danger from the respondent, it must
be concluded that the main purpose of the interview was to gather
information about past events for potential future prosecution.”).
74
In re S.P., 215 P.3d 847 (Or. 2009).
75
Id. at 864 (quoting State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. v.
S.P., 178 P.3d 318, 330 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)).
76
Id. at 865. In State v. Moreno-Garcia, 260 P.3d 522, 527 (Or. Ct.
App. 2011), the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that “[a]lthough we agree
with the state that CARES’s functions are diagnostic and forensic, the
forensic aspect is pervasive.”
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In State v. Arnold,77 the Supreme Court of Ohio examined an
interview by an employee of a Child Advocacy Center
(“CAC”). The court considered the objectives of the interview
to be neither exclusively for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment, nor solely for forensic investigation.78 The court took
the view that neither police officers nor medical personnel in the
multidisciplinary team became agents of the other and that the
single interviewer acted as an agent of each team. The court
ruled that statements made for medical diagnosis and treatment
were nontestimonial. It ruled that other statements that served
primarily a forensic or investigative purpose were testimonial.
The court directed the lower courts to sort these statements out
within the interview rather than treating them under a single
category.79
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant may be read by
courts to provide flexibility to make just this type of rule.
However, Bryant did not suggest that emergencies continue
forever, and it did not give license to courts to ignore the fact
that an interview had only forensic purposes. Bryant will,
nevertheless, push the dividing line at the margin in the direction
of a nontestimonial determination.80
77

State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775 (Ohio 2010).
Id. at 782–83.
79
Id. at 785–86. Albeit supposedly applicable only to hearsay analysis
and not Confrontation Clause treatment, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
pulled back from a categorical approach that excluded “medically pertinent
statements just because they were made to a [sexual assault nurse examiner]
when those same statements would be admissible if made to a doctor or to a
nurse in the emergency room.” State v. Mendez, 242 P.3d 328, 339 (N.M.
2010). Instead, it directed the courts to consider the substance and
circumstances surrounding each individual statement, determining in each
instance the purpose for which each was made. Id. at 339. Mendez overruled
in part State v. Ortega, 175 P.3d 929 (N.M. 2007). See Kimberly Y. Chin,
Note, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped
Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After Crawford and Davis,
30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 99 (2010) (arguing for an approach that
examines the videotaped interview closely and excludes only the specific
portions that are testimonial).
80
In State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 304–05 (Tenn. 2008), the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the statements made by the victim to the
78
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By contrast, the decision in S.P. has the very different effect
of correcting what I see as a fundamental error in the effective
burden of showing that a statement should enjoy Confrontation
Clause protection. Most lower courts understood the Davis
opinion to require that the defense show that the primary
purpose of the interrogation was to create a testimonial
statement. In essence, S.P. stands for the proposition that a
statement is testimonial if one of the purposes of the
interrogation was to create a testimonial statement. That
allocation of the burden is the appropriate one in enforcing this
constitutional right. The defendant should have a constitutional
right to confront statements which were made with a substantial
or significant purpose of creating a testimonial statement, or
where that purpose was a clear motivating factor. Nothing about
the structure or effect of the fundamental confrontation right
suggests that it should be applied with reluctance, or indicates
that a heavy burden should be placed on the defendant in
claiming its application.81 However, even before the negative
impact on Confrontation Clause protection that I anticipate from
the Bryant decision, the cases did not recognize the importance
of allocating the burden to the prosecution to show investigation
of a crime was not a significant purpose, nor a trend to follow
the path of S.P.

nurse in the emergency room were not testimonial but those made to the
sexual assault nurse examiner were testimonial. It stated: “We caution,
however, that our conclusion in this case should not be interpreted as a
blanket rule characterizing as testimonial all the portions of all out-of-court
statements given by sexual assault victims to sexual assault nurse examiners.”
Id. at 305. It suggested that in other cases, the interview may move from
nontestimonial to testimonial, and trial courts should redact some portions of
the interview rather than exclude it all. Id. Use of the latter approach that
admits much of these interviews is likely to increase after Bryant.
81
The analysis that I suggest should be followed is similar to that
illustrated by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). There in
the employment discrimination context, the Court determined that
discrimination had been shown if the plaintiff showed that it was a
“motivating factor” or “substantial factor” in the adverse employment action
rather than the sole factor that was required under McDonnell Douglas v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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V. OTHER ISSUES
Courts in children’s cases have continued to make some
progress in addressing a range of issues raised in eliciting
statements outside of court, and in presenting children’s
testimony when they appear at trial and are cross-examined.
However, courts have largely failed to provide ways to facilitate
meaningful
confrontation
in
particularly
challenging
circumstances.
A. Application of Melendez-Diaz Concepts in Children’s
Cases
Under Crawford’s testimonial doctrine, when a witness takes
the stand and repeats an out-of-court statement that she has
heard, the Confrontation Clause is implicated only if the
statement being repeated by this “ear witness” was testimonial in
nature. Thus, if a doctor takes the stand and repeats a child’s
statement made to secure medical treatment, or if a grandmother
takes the stand and repeats her granddaughter’s statements about
sexual abuse elicited out of concern for the child’s welfare, no
constitutional violation has occurred. The nontestimonial nature
of the declarant’s statement means that it is exempt from
scrutiny under the confrontation doctrine.
However, the “ear witness” must testify. If instead, the
child’s statements are presented through a document prepared by
the “ear witness” with an expectation that it would be used as a
record of past events for potential use in a criminal prosecution,
then the Confrontation Clause is violated. This is not because
the nature of the declarant’s original statement was testimonial,
but because the repetition of that statement occurs in the form of
a testimonial statement from the nontestifying “ear witness.”
In Vega v. State,82 the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that
the Confrontation Clause was violated when the content of a
report of a sexual abuse examination by a nurse at a county
child advocacy center was introduced through a doctor.83 The
82
83

Vega v. State, 236 P.3d 632 (Nev. 2010).
Id. at 637–38.
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court focused on whether an objective witness would reasonably
have believed that the nurse’s statement would be available for
use at a later trial.84 In Green v. State,85 the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals found the report of a sexual assault forensic
examiner (“SAFE”) to be testimonial using the same reasoning.86
This issue is similar to, but distinct from, the analysis used
when determining the primary purpose of the interrogation. In
Melendez-Diaz, Justice Scalia noted that “[b]usiness and public
records are generally admissible absent confrontation not
because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but
because—having been created for the administration of an
entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”87
Justice Scalia is not describing an emergency purpose for the
initial statement, but is resting the decision on the fact that the
document reciting that statement was created for a
nontestimonial purpose. The appropriate inquiry is whether the
document was prepared with an understanding that it would be
available for use at a later trial. In this inquiry, the intent of the
declarant is irrelevant, because the testimonial act is that of the
recorder in writing down the statement to be presented in court,
not of the declarant in making the initial statement. Multiplepurpose statements that are videotaped do not present this issue
because the words of the initial declarant are mechanically
reproduced in court. However, when it is memorialized through
the potentially selective and inaccurate words of the interviewer,
the same interview should be treated as testimonial if the person
creating the written document understood that its purpose was to
constitute evidence.

84

Id. at 638 (applying Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, rather than the
primary purpose test under Davis).
85
Green v. State, 22 A.3d 941 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).
86
Id. at 950–56.
87
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–41 (2009). He also observed
that medical reports created for treatment purposes would not be testimonial.
Id. at 2533 n.2.
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B. Requirement of the Prosecution Calling the Witness
Rather than Mere Availability to Satisfy Confronting
the Witness
In Crawford, the Supreme Court stated: “we reiterate that,
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of
his prior testimonial statements.”88 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court
made clear that the defendant’s ability to call the witness for
cross-examination is not sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause. The Court stated that
the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the
prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant
to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to
the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the
prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits
and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he
chooses.89
These principles should require that children be called to the
stand by the prosecution before their statements may be
introduced under this “present confrontation” exception to
Crawford. I encourage use of this procedure in preference to
loss of evidence to the prosecution and denial of confrontation to
the defendant. To some readers, the insistence that children be
called and, as discussed in the next section, questioned by the
prosecution on direct about the crime and be subject to crossexamination by the defense, may appear to be insensitive and to
subject the victim to further victimization. Sensitivity is
appropriate. However, prosecutors and researchers frequently
find that children can be enabled to testify by carefully working
with the child to familiarize her with the court proceedings.90
88

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
89
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540 (“[The witness] was subpoenaed,
but she did not appear at . . . trial.” (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 820 (2006))).
90
See Robert P. Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation
of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 592 (2005); see also Eileen A.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

420

In State v. Caper,91 the Louisiana Court of Appeals applied
these principles. It held that the defendant’s confrontation rights
were violated where recorded testimonial statements of two
children were presented but the children did not testify,
“[a]lthough they were present at the courthouse and were
available to be called as witnesses.”92
C. The Meaning of “Subject to Cross-Examination” for
Compliance with Confrontation Through Current
Cross-Examination
“Subject to cross-examination” requires the presence of the
child on the stand in a situation where he or she can be asked
questions, but it does require more than merely placing a child
on the stand. I have argued previously for a requirement of
“minimal capacity” for a witness, which most often presents an
issue for very young children:
To be sure, simply putting a child on the stand,
regardless of her mental maturity, is not sufficient to
eliminate all Confrontation Clause concerns. If, for
example, a child is so young that she cannot be crossexamined at all . . . the fact that she is physically present
in the courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the
demands of the Clause.” Confrontation theory, the Due
Process Clause, or the competency concept must provide
some constitutional floor, albeit certainly at a very low
level, as to minimal testimonial adequacy. To date,
Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other
Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558, 1575–76 (2009)
(citing sources that most children are able to testify if prepared and supported
in the process and that the outcome of the prosecution may have as much
impact on the child’s well being as whether the child testifies).
91
State v. Caper, 41 So. 3d 605 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
92
Id. at 607, 617. In State ex rel. D.G., 40 So. 3d 409, 411 (La. Ct.
App. 2010), another panel of the Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled, after the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded D.G. v. Louisiana, 130 S. Ct. 1729
(2010), in light of Melendez-Diaz, that in a juvenile case where there is no
jury, the prosecution making the child witness available is sufficient. The
result appears plainly wrong.
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courts have gone no further than Spotted War Bonnet in
recognizing that a limit must exist, but not yet attempting
a concrete definition.93
In addition, two other types of relatively bright line rules
should apply to how the testimony is elicited. First, the
prosecution must make an effort to elicit the accusation of abuse
from the child. Asking about innocuous details is not sufficient
without asking about the criminal actions of the perpetrator. On
the other hand, the child need not acknowledge the criminal
activity, and can even deny it. However, the child must be asked
about it. Such a question gives the witness an opportunity to
make her accusation in the presence of the defendant and
provides the jury a basis for evaluation, regardless of the answer
given by the child to the prosecutor’s question regarding the
alleged criminal activity.94
In addition, I contend the participation of the child in crossexamination is required, absent defense complicity in silencing
the witness’ responses.
If the child ceases answering questions before crossexamination, she is clearly not available for crossexamination because none was possible. However, if a
child of minimal ability answers some cross-examination
questions, she should be treated as available for crossexamination if the questions answered give the jury a
sufficient basis to evaluate her testimony.95
A number of cases found limited responses by young
witnesses minimally sufficient. Two cases from the Illinois
Appeals Court are representative. In People v. Bryant,96 the
seven-year-old victim described sex acts committed by the
defendant under one count, but did not describe any conduct
93

Mosteller, supra note 90, at 596 (quoting United States v. Spotted War
Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991)). In Cookson v. Schwartz, 556
F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh Circuit characterized Spotted War
Bonnet as dealing with “witnesses who are ‘too young’ or ‘too frightened’ to
be cross-examined.”
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See Mosteller, supra note 90, at 585.
95
Mosteller, supra note 29, at 991.
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People v. Bryant, 909 N.E.2d 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
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satisfying the charge in another count. The court nevertheless
found the child subject to cross-examination about the second
count because she answered defense counsel’s questions on
cross-examination.97 Similarly, in People v. Major-Fisk,98 the
court found a child subject to cross-examination where the child
testified on direct examination that the defendant made the child
sit on his hand—which could be seen as related to the conduct
charged although without facts necessary to constitute a crime—
and then answered all the questions posed on cross-examination
by defense counsel.99
By contrast, the requisites of confrontation and availability
for cross-examination were satisfied in People v. Learn,100 but
the Illinois Appeals Court held the child’s testimony inadequate.
The child gave only general answers to the prosecutor’s
questions, but the prosecution generally attempted to elicit the
accusation. The child admitted knowing the defendant, but when
asked about going to the police station and whether she had been
asked some questions there, she put her head down and began to
cry. After a short recess, the prosecution asked whether the
child felt better, to which the child responded that she did not
know. The prosecution then asked no further questions.101 The
trial court imposed no limitations on cross-examination,102 and
the child answered all the questions asked by the defense on
cross-examination, although defense counsel did not broach the
subject of the crime with her.103 The requisites were satisfied
because the prosecution attempted to elicit the accusation from
the child and the child responded to defense questions on crossexamination, which the defense apparently chose to limit to
innocuous matters.
97

Id. at 400.
People v. Major-Fisk, 923 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
99
Id. at 336; see also, e.g., Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 212 (Wyo.
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determination that the child was subject to cross-examination under the
Confrontation Clause).
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These minimal requirements for availability for crossexamination will be challenging to apply, for example, when
determining when a child who is predominantly unresponsive
has responded sufficiently on cross-examination. Realistically,
little is required beyond the presence of a minimally competent
child on the stand, along with both an effort by the prosecution
to secure an accusation and an opportunity for the defense to ask
questions of a child who is minimally responsive.104
The logistics of when to introduce the prior statement of the
child, relative to the child’s testimony, present challenges in
assuring the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the child
regarding the out-of-court statement. Myer v. State105 dealt with
the important issue of the timing of cross-examination: the
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that, when a statement is
admitted after the child’s testimony, the defense must be
permitted to recall the child for cross-examination.106
D. Alternative Methods of Achieving Confrontation
Efforts should be made to encourage confrontation rather
than to focus on excluding testimony.107 Any change to current
doctrine that reduces confrontation is arguably problematic.
However, when the only available options are the exclusion of
evidence or a ruling that the defendant’s confrontation rights
104

This is only modestly different from the concept of the “The ‘Warm
Breathing Body’ Rule” suggested by Professor Eileen Scallen. See Scallen,
supra note 90, at 1575–81.
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state’s argument that the burden of calling a child witness could be placed
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for a different result where the child appears and testifies about the acts
related to the charged conduct, and the burden-shifting relates only to hearsay
statements regarding uncharged bad act evidence); State v. Hill, 715 S.E.2d
368, 375 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) (finding no error when the child’s recorded
statement was introduced after she had completed her examination, given that
the defense was not prohibited from recalling her to examine the child
regarding the statement).
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either did not exist or were not violated, some compromise
regarding the degree of confrontation required may be the best
course. This is particularly true in cases involving abhorrent
crimes and sympathetic victims, which put great pressure on the
courts to admit incriminating hearsay that is apparently reliable
despite a lack of confrontation. Unfortunately, only modest
efforts have been made to secure more testimony and
confrontation through the creation of alternative procedures,
such as having hearings prior to trial where witnesses can testify
and face confrontation.
The Nevada Supreme Court has ruled that the preliminary
hearing under the state’s criminal procedure guaranteed to
defendants an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. It
permits examination into credibility and does not limit the scope
of cross-examination to only matters of probable cause.
Moreover, the state permits discovery before the preliminary
hearing.108 On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court ruled
that its discovery deposition procedure was inadequate to
constitute prior confrontation. It reasoned that the procedure “was
not designed as an opportunity to engage in adversarial testing of
the evidence against the defendant” but instead “to learn what the
testimony will be,” and that the defendant could not conduct an
adequate cross-examination during a deposition when he learns
for the first time of the information. Moreover, the deposition
could not serve as “the functional substitute for in-court
confrontation” because it was admissible only for the purpose of
impeachment and the defendant was not entitled to be present.109
Like Nevada, states should develop alternative procedures to
allow the defendant to have an opportunity to challenge witnesses’
testimony before trial or in alternative procedural settings.
However, Texas has gone too far in authorizing the receipt of
recorded testimony with only the opportunity for cross-
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examination through written interrogatories.110 The lack of the
opportunity for the jury to observe how questions are asked, and
how the child gives the answers, is a central failing of this
alternative procedure. Nevertheless, the state’s effort to provide
somewhat limited confrontation if, in fact, full confrontation is
not feasible is commendable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Confrontation Clause results in cases involving child
declarants under the Crawford testimonial model have been
reasonably stable and consistent over the past few years. Courts
have found statements to police officers testimonial in almost all
cases. In a substantial number of cases, courts concluded that
where social workers or forensic interviewers conducted recorded
interviews with an investigative purpose, the statements secured
were testimonial. Relatively few cases found such interviews to
be responding to an ongoing emergency. However, statements by
children in the vast bulk of other circumstances were generally
found to be nontestimonial.
The apparent clarity of the Supreme Court’s directive can
account, at least in part, for the relatively consistent findings that
statements were testimonial in the two situations described above.
Davis appeared to draw a clear line with respect to timing and
purpose, and courts acted as if they had no real alternative.
Unfortunately, the Bryant decision will likely inject substantially
more discretion—and therefore uncertainty—into the analysis of
these two classes of statements, with the result that many of them
will now be found nontestimonial.
Crawford has provided some protection to defendants from
government-generated hearsay of the most dangerous
accusatorial type. When statements are made to the police or
their clear surrogates, the protection is substantial. Relatively

110
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for the prosecution to develop evidence of trauma if the child testifies and far
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little else receives any protection under the Confrontation
Clause. I am not convinced that the system that has resulted
from Crawford, where the vast bulk of even accusatorial
statements made to others are freed from confrontation, is
rational under confrontation policy or consistent with history. It
is unclear whether Crawford’s impact on children’s cases was
worth the substantial upheaval in trial courts reflected in the
mass of litigation it engendered. If Bryant has the effect that I
anticipate of expanding trial court discretion to find even
statements to government investigators exempt from
confrontation protection, that impact will be even more modest
and the current predictability of results will diminish.
For those who hold a defendant’s right to confront witnesses
in high regard, the Crawford effort was likely still justified
because it requires confrontation or exclusion for the particularly
problematic category of statements made by alleged accomplices
during police interrogation, and, at least prior to Bryant, strictly
regulated most statements by witnesses to the police about past
events. However, the doctrine’s dimensions are far less
substantial, protective, and beneficial than could reasonably have
been anticipated when it was first decided. The Crawford
approach is an improvement on Ohio v. Roberts,111 but its
development has been disappointing, and the evolving doctrine
shows limited promise.
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